The continuous growth of attacks in the Internet causes to generate a number of rules in security devices such as Intrusion Prevention Systems, firewalls, etc. Policy anomalies in security devices create security holes and prevent the system from determining quickly whether allow or deny a packet. Policy anomalies exist among the rules in multiple security devices as well as in a single security device. The solution for policy anomalies requires complex and complicated algorithms. In this paper, we propose a new method to remove policy anomalies in a single security device and avoid policy anomalies among the rules in distributed security devices. The proposed method classifies rules according to traffic direction and checks policy anomalies in each device. It is unnecessary to compare the rules for outgoing traffic with the rules for incoming traffic. Therefore, classifying rules by in-out traffic, the proposed method can reduce the number of rules to be compared up to a half. Instead of detecting policy anomalies in distributed security devices, one adopts the rules from others for avoiding anomaly. After removing policy anomalies in each device, other firewalls can keep the policy consistency without anomalies by adopting the rules of a trusted firewall. In addition, it blocks unnecessary traffic because a source side sends as much traffic as the destination side accepts. Also we explain another policy anomaly which can be found under a connection-oriented communication protocol.
Introduction
The basic function of a firewall is to screen network communications to prevent unauthorized access to or from a computer network [1] . Firewalls decide whether to deny or allow traffic according to a predefined set of rules. Because firewalls provide fundamental protection for the target network, they play a crucial role in the network traffic management. To cope with increasing attacks and threats for network, most firewalls have a large number of rules. A rule consists of predicates for protocol fields and appropriate action. When all
• We blocked the unnecessary traffic from source devices. The proposed method adopts rules from the other devices. It means that the source devices send the packets as much as the destination devices accept and vice versa. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 briefly outlines related work. Chapter 3 explains anomaly problem in security policy. Chapter 4 describes the proposed method for a single security device. Chapter 5 presents the proposed method for multiple security devices. Chapter 6 presents implemented application and experimental results. In Chapter 7, we summarize our experience.
Related Work
A firewall is the network equipment that denies or accepts a packet based on policy. Policy anomalies occur when multiple rules are applied a packet in a single device. In list-based firewalls, since only the first matching rule is applied to the packet, the others are useless. However, policy anomalies in distributed firewall are more complicated than in a single firewall. Both network topologies and data paths should be considered when detecting policy anomalies. There have been many challenges to solving such anomalies and maintaining the configuration integrity of the security policy.
Al-Shaer et al. [4] [5] [6] analyzed anomalies that can occur in a single firewall or in multiple firewalls. They formalized the relations among the rules and represented the firewall policy by a policy tree. They also devised a state diagram for discovering firewall anomalies. This technique was implemented in a software tool called the Firewall Policy Advisor (FPA). The FPA finds potential problems in legacy firewalls and supports anomaly-free policy editing for insertion, removal, and modification of rules.
Hamed et al. [7] provided the taxonomy of policy anomalies classified into access-list conflicts and map-list conflicts in network security devices. They tried to find policy conflicts in various types of security devices and implemented the Security Policy Advisor (SPA) tool, which used the Ordered Binary Decision Diagram (OBDD) [8] to present and manipulate the policy expressions. The SPA supports automatic discovery of security policy conflicts among firewalls including IPSec devices.
Liu and Gupda [9] [10] [11] proposed three design principles for a firewall: consistency, which means that the rules are ordered correctly; completeness which means that every packet satisfies at least one rule in the firewall; and compactness which means that the firewall has no redundant rules. They developed the Firewall Decision Diagram (FDD) to implement them. They applied a sequence of five algorithms to FDD to generate, to reduce, and to simplify the target firewall rules for maintaining consistency, compactness, and completeness of the original FDD.
Lu et al. [12] proposed a method of representing the firewall rule table that allows for a comparison of two tables. They compared the similarities between a set of packets that are permitted by the two tables. If the sets of packets are same, the two tables are deemed equivalent . This method can also be used to analyze changes to a rule table and to determine  whether desired changes are made correctly by comparing the original rule table and the  modified one. Yuan et al. [13] proposed a system known as the FIREwall Modeling and Analysis (FIREMAN), which applies static analysis techniques to check for misconfigurations or policy anomalies in distributed firewalls as well as in individual firewalls. The FIREMAN discovers the violation of user-specific security policies and inconsistencies among firewall rules. FIREMAN uses the Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) that have been used successfully in hardware verification and model checking. The FIREMAN performs symbolic model checking of the firewall configurations for all possible IP packets along all possible data paths. It evaluates the firewall configuration as an entire set that is not just limited to relations between two firewall rules in distributed firewalls.
Alfaro et al proposed the MIsconfiguRAtion manaGer (MIRAGE) [14] [15] [16] , which detects anomalies in a network security policy. They pointed out that some previous research studies were incomplete in their efforts to find all anomalies. They described a set of algorithms to manage policy consistency based on the analysis of relationships between the set of filtering rules. They detected and removed anomalies among rules both in a single device and in multiple devices. In addition, they generated a completely independent rule set that removed correlation among the rules. They compared all rules in firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems on the network path from the network topology.
Algorithms to find policy anomalies require the high cost because the complexity of comparison among the rules. Pozo et al. [17] proposed the Potential Conflicts Graph (PCG) to diagnose the consistency of the firewall rule set. The PCG isolates all inconsistencies among every pair of rules in an order-independent process and identifies the minimum number of conflicting rules. However, it cannot find all kinds of policy anomalies as they stated. Furthermore, they proposed a diagnostic method to use the Constraint Satisfaction Problem in Artificial Intelligence [18] . Abedin et al. [19] proposed a method to generate a new rule set without anomaly. It simultaneously detects and resolves any anomaly present in the rules by reorder and split operations. Yoon et al. [20] proposed a method to reduce the size of the rule set. The algorithm for the reduction of the rule set finds a group of rules and replaces them with a smaller new group with the same meaning.
Research on policy anomalies mainly finds anomalies based on a set theory. The solution to policy anomalies is to separate or disjoint such rules. Since the separation of rules generates many subsequent rules, it requires the aggregation or the merging of rules. The complexity of this task increases substantially in proportion to the number of rules. The proposed method detects anomalies and generates completely disjointed rules without anomalies. It classifies rules by in-out traffic: rules for incoming traffic and rules for outgoing traffic. Each group has opposite addresses in the source address and the destination address. Since it is unnecessary to compare rules in one group with the other group, the proposed method reduces the number of rules to be compared when finding anomalies among the rules in each firewall. Rule-based packet classification by in-out traffic showed good performance for signature matching an Intrusion Detection System [21] .
We devised a unique approach to distributed firewalls. It avoids anomalies by replacing rules with one another among firewalls without anomaly detection. It simply replaces the other firewall's rules with the other firewall's rules that an administrator can trust. If there is no anomaly in each firewall, we can have the rules without anomalies in all distributed firewalls. It also allows as much traffic as the source network and the destination network have to exchange. Therefore, it is a more complete approach in that it blocks the unnecessary traffic from its source. Besides, with the observation of the network protocol and traffic classification, we found a new kind of misconfiguration which had not been found in previous research.
Problem of Policy Anomaly
We explain the problem of policy anomaly in a single firewall and among distributed firewalls in this chapter. Policy anomalies occur when one rule has overlapping regions with others in a rule set. In an order-sensitive rules set, when multiple rules are applied to a certain packet, others except the most priority one are abnormal rules. Though all rules are completely disjointed with others, firewalls can have rules which are not relevant to their traffic. Such rules are useless and should thus be removed. We define all kinds of policy anomalies and describe a new anomaly which was found in packet classification by in-out traffic. For the sake of simplicity, we only considered a hierarchical network topology.
Existing Policy Anomalies
It is very similar to define the terms of policy anomaly [3] [4][6] [9] [10] [13] . Based on the previous researches, we explain the types of anomalies in view of set relation. Each rule in firewalls has the form, . consists of Boolean expressions over protocol fields, such as source address, destination address, source port number, destination port number, etc.
can be "deny" or "accept". We denote a set of rules by , i.e., = . Let , denote one of the rules respectively and assume that has the precedence over . Let denote the correlation. We represent the correlation using other terms, such as partial redundancy and partial shadowing because they can be separated into three subsets, as in the following:
These three subsets do not have the intersection. Since is a subset of , is a subset of , and r r  , can be presented with completely disjointed subsets and exactly a matching subset. It means that we can represent all relations only through completely disjointed relations and exactly matching relations if we split them. Therefore, we defined three types of anomalies in a single security device as follows:
Intra-shadowing occurs when any packet which matches the preceding rule also matches the subsequent rule , and has a different decision from .
Intra-redundancy occurs when any packet which matches the preceding rule also matches the subsequent rule , and has the same decision with .
Intra-irrelevance occurs when there is a rule which is irrelevant to the traffic of the device.
Policy anomalies for distributed security devices are more complicated than that in a single security device. To find anomalies among distributed security devices, we have to consider data paths and topologies in the network. We define "zones" as network addresses directly connected to the security device. Let denote the security device in source zone and denote one rule of . Let denote the security device in destination zone and denote one rule of . We assume that network traffic goes from to . Unlike a single device, Inter-shadowing occurs when the source device with a rule blocks a packet, the destination device with a rule allows the packet. Since does not send a packet to , is unnecessary.
Inter-redundancy occurs when the source device with a rule blocks a packet, the destination device with a rule blocks the packet again. Since does not send a packet to , is unnecessary.
Inter-spuriousness occurs when the source device with a rule allows any packet, the destination device with a rule blocks that packet. Since sends a packet which is denied by , is unnecessary.
Inter-redundancy anomaly can be intentionally allowed to enforce the security of a network. For example, a conservative administrator may always block some traffic explicitly out of fear that the upstream firewall may fail. Therefore, though our related works refer to it as an anomaly, it is open to debate whether inter-redundancy anomaly is, in fact, even an anomaly.
Asymmetry Anomaly
The rules in a firewall generally can be classified by two types as traffic is divided by direction. One type involves the rules for incoming traffic, and the other includes the rules for outgoing traffic. We define them as incoming rules and outgoing rules, respectively. This simple idea greatly reduces the complexity of anomaly detection because we do not need to compare one group with the other group. Also, by classifying them, we can find another misconfiguration. Most network communications require the interactions between hosts or networks. Most of all, when TCP protocol creates a network connection, it requires two-way communication. Therefore, if there is an IP address which only receives or sends a packet in a rule set, it cannot be a normal situation. We define it as an intra-asymmetry anomaly.
Let denote a set of incoming rules and a set of outgoing rules in rule set R. Also, we denote the set of source addresses and the set of destination addresses used in by and , respectively. In the same way, let us denote and in . The asymmetry anomaly occurs in the following situation:
Intra-asymmetry occurs when there is a rule which only has a network address for outgoing traffic or for incoming traffic under the protocol of two-way communication.
There are some restrictions in finding an intra-asymmetry anomaly. If the rules do not use a two-way communication, it is unnecessary to find intra-asymmetry anomaly. Also, if there are rules that keep track of currently-established connections in stateful firewalls, such rules do
not have the intra-asymmetry because they are used for both incoming traffic and outgoing traffic. Therefore, when parsing the rules, if there is any rule having a connection state in the rule set, we simply skip that rule. The intra-asymmetry anomaly is a new type of misconfiguration which could not be found in previous research. Fig. 1 shows two firewalls deployed in a network. We can find all types of policy anomalies that occur in a single firewall and among multiple firewalls in Fig. 1 . The anomalies found in Fig. 1 while a rule with a partial anomaly requires to be resized to its domain region. We explain how to find all anomalies in the next section.
Fig. 1. Example of a network that has deployed two firewalls

Example of Policy Anomaly
Detecting Anomalies and Rewriting Rules
In this section, we describe a new method not only to find policy anomalies but also to rewrite new rules without anomalies. We classify the rules by in-out traffic to reduce the cost of rule comparisons. If there is a rule not included in two classified groups, the rule has an irrelevance anomaly. To find other anomalies such as shadowing, redundancy, and asymmetry, we devised a bitmap array structure, called the Predicates Bitmap Constructor (PBC). Since correlation and inclusive relation are split by overlapping region and non-overlapping region within a PBC, all the rules have only exactly matching relations or completely disjointed relations. The proposed method uses the PBC to remove all anomalies and rewrite new rules in a firewall.
PBC (Predicate Bitmap Constructor)
In a firewall, given a set of rules, i.e., , let denote the set of protocol fields presented in . Let denote the set of the predicates associated with in . Let denote the set of distinct comparative values extracted from used in in ascending order. We can describe one rule of , , such as following:
A predicate used in can be presented as , where is an operator used in the predicates ( , , ,etc.). Therefore, Eq. (3) can be described as following:
As seen in Eq. (4) 
In Eq. (5) 
Predicates Bitmap Construct (PBC) is an array data structure holding the result bitmaps according to each domain region of a protocol field . We described the structure of the PBC in Fig. 2 
Fig. 2. Predicates Bitmap Constructor for
Removing Anomalies
We explain anomaly detection and correction in a rule set using PBCs. In a firewall, incoming rules have external addresses in a source address and internal addresses in a destination address, while outgoing rules have opposite source and destination addresses against incoming rules. If there is a rule not included in two rule groups, an irrelevance anomaly is occurred because the rule is irrelevant to traffic of the device. After classifying rules by in-out traffic, we check the policy integrity in each group, and , respectively. This simple classification reduces the number of rules to be compared in a firewall. Therefore, we create the PBC of each rule group to detect anomalies. For example, there is a rule set which consists of four rules in Table 2 . If the firewall having this rule set has 1.1.1.0/24 for its zone address, there are three rules for outgoing traffic ( , , ) and one rule for incoming traffic ( ). We explain how to create the PBC only for the outgoing rules because the other is the same process. Since there is no predicate of source port (SP), three PBCs for a source address (SIP), a destination address (DIP), and a destination port (DP) are created. Algorithm 1 describes how to create PBC for . is the interval region between and . For PBC for SIP, we extract distinct comparative values from the predicates for source address used in , , and . After sorting them in ascending order, we identify constant regions and interval regions between two constant regions as Eq. (5) describes. There are two distinct comparative values, "1.1.1.1" and "1.1.1.4" in , , and . Since we already know the zone address, the minimum and the maximum addresses of the zone are included. Each rule domain bitmap is set by which returns a bitmap of in certain domain regions. In the region of source addresses "1.1.1.1" -"1.1.1.3", since and except are matched, the rule domain bitmap has "011". In order to reduce the array size, the domain regions having the same results are merged. The PBC for DIP and the PBC for DP are created in the same way. Three PBCs in Table 2 are presented in Fig. 3 . Since the domain of protocol fields in the PBC are divided by the minimum overlapping region, all rules in the PBC are divided by completely disjointed relations or exactly matching relations without correlations and inclusive relations. We can find which rules apply to which domain regions in domain of the protocol field. When rules 
Algorithm 1 CreatePBC( , )
Require:
Ensure: (6) indicates. In the algorithm, returns the position of the highest non-zero bit in the result bitmap. If the position of the highest non-zero bit in result bitmap of is , is the first rule to be applied to the domain region. Otherwise, the preceding rule is applied in the domain region because of the priority among the rules. When finding the first rule to be applied to that domain region of , we split into a normal domain region and an abnormal domain region. We merge two domain regions when result bitmaps are the same; all domain regions of protocol fields except one are the same, and the exceptional one is consecutive to the other. Table 2 . ("X" means "Don't Care Bit" and colored rows have anomalies) Fig. 4(a) presents the process of the anomaly detection and rule rewriting for and in Table 2 . Each row in the table, which was split from the original rule, can be a rule. Is excluded because it is the highest priority rule. Since the first matched rule is applied, subsequent rules are anomalies. In case of , we can get two split rules without anomalies and overlaps. In case of , is shadowed by in the domain region ( , , ) and redundant with in the domain region ( , , ). Therefore, has a complete anomaly because the preceding rules are first applied in all domain regions of . The PBC is also used to resolve an asymmetry anomaly. The source addresses for incoming rules must be the same as the destination addresses for outgoing rules and vice versa. Therefore, we compare incoming rules and outgoing rules or vice versa after exchanging the source address and destination address of each group. For the detection of the asymmetry anomaly of incoming rules, we search PBCs for outgoing rules with each rule in incoming rules as described in Algorithm 3. Fig. 4(b) shows how to find the asymmetry anomaly with PBCs for outgoing rules and one rule for incoming rules. We search the PBC with exchanged IP addresses and obtain a combined result bitmap, such as finding a redundancy anomaly and a shadowing anomaly. The asymmetry anomaly occurs when the result bitmap has all "0" bits like (
). The rewriting process for removing the asymmetry anomaly is similar to other return true 8: else 9:
return false 10: end if Table 3 shows the final result without anomalies after rule rewriting. Because there is no overlap among the rules, we do not need to keep "accept" rules and "deny" rules at same time. Therefore, we leave only one type of rules having the same decision. Since firewalls have list-base ACLs which have order-sensitive properties, if the blacklisted IP addresses or white-listed IP addresses are in a rule set, these rules are overlapped by subsequent rules. Therefore, subsequent rules have partial redundancy or shadowing with the blacklisted IP addresses or white-listed IP addresses. The proposed method splits them without overlaps, but it generates too many rules. To avoid such a problem, the proposed method allows them. That is, rules having intentional anomalies can be excluded when rules are parsed. 
Avoiding Anomalies in Distributed Firewalls
Detecting anomalies and rewriting rules for multiple devices is a little more complicated than doing so for a single device, as discussed above. We propose a different approach to solve anomalies in distributed firewalls; namely, we strive to avoid them. The proposed method can be used without removing intra-anomalies. However, for the sake of simplicity, we assumed intra-anomalies of each firewall were removed by adopting our method for intra-anomalies. Therefore, there is no overlap among the rules in each firewall. We assume that one firewall can have multiple zones, but a zone is allocated to one firewall. The gateway firewall has all the zone firewall's traffic heading for internal and external networks as follows. For example, if incoming rules in F z1 are right, they can be propagated to the other firewalls, (a) is propagated to (b). When the rules in a trusted firewall have different decisions from the rules of the other firewalls, it seems undesirable to replace the "deny" rules of the other firewalls with the "accept" rules of the trusted firewall. However, if all firewalls are in a single administrator's domain and the administrator trusts in the rules of the target firewall, it does not matter to substitute the rules of the trusted firewall for the rules of the other firewalls. By propagating these rules to corresponding firewalls, the other firewalls send or deny packets as the rules of the trusted firewall do. The proposed method was devised to avoid detection of policy anomalies and comparison of rules and to obtain the consistency among all firewalls. Since the proposed method is based on an administrator's trust in rules, the administrator has to verify the rules before propagating them. Although the administrator trusts the "accept" rules of the target firewall, the administrator may not want to replace the "deny" rules of the other firewall with the "accept" rules of the trusted firewall. We define such a case as an inter-shadowing anomaly because the trusted firewall denies traffic which cannot flow in its zone. Before propagating the rules of target firewall, the administrator has to consider that problem. Trust of the rules includes that there is no policy anomaly in the rules of the trusted firewall. However, if an administrator does not have confidence in the rules of the trusted firewall or if an administrator want to keep the "deny" rules of other firewalls, the administrator can insert the rules of the trusted firewall into other firewall without deleting "deny" rules from other firewalls. In such a case, the rules of other firewalls can deny the traffic which they want to deny but other firewalls may have intra-anomalies, which can be solved by the proposed method for intra-anomalies. 
F
Since there could be some conflicts among rules between two firewalls, some methods have been proposed to detect such anomalies. For that purpose, we also proposed a method to detect and correct policy anomalies among multiple firewalls in our previous paper [3] . After removing policy anomalies among firewalls using such methods, we can adopt the proposed method which replaces the rules of other firewalls with the rules of the trusted firewall.
Implementation and Experiments
The proposed method was implemented in a software prototype called the Policy Anomaly Resolver (PAR). The PAR has been coded by   C . The PAR parses rule sets and creates four PBCs, as described above. The PAR can detect overlaps among the rules and rewrite completely disjointed rules without anomalies and overlaps. The size of each PBC for protocol fields depends on the distinct number of comparative values of corresponding predicates. The size of the PBC does not have a great influence on detecting and rewriting performance. However, the overlapping relation among the rules has a great effect on performance. For the experiments, we used two types of rule sets. One involves four different ACL rules from the internal network switches, which were deployed in one Korean online game company. Table 4 shows the detailed characteristics of three ACL rule sets. "#SIP," "#SP," "#DIP," and "#DP" are the numbers of distinct comparative values used in each predicate of a source address, a source port, a destination address, and a destination port, respectively. "Avg. ROC" is the average of ROC in each rule. "ACL3" has few overlaps among the rules, while "ACL4" has a lot of overlaps among the rules. Since the overlap among the rules makes an anomaly, "ACL3" is much better managed compared to "ACL1," "ACL2," and "ACL4." The other one, "SNT" was made from the VRT Certified Rules for Snort, version 2.7. [22] . We classified Snort rules for TCP and grouped them by source address, destination address, source port, destination port, and in-out traffic. Then, we chose 150 rules for outgoing traffic which have specific port numbers in the destination port. Fig. 6 shows the processing time of the PAR on each rule set. The PAR was executed on a personal computer with 1Gbyte memory and a Core 2 2.13GHz CPU. The cost of rule rewriting increased exponentially according to the number of rules. The major factor for the processing time is the average ROC, as shown in Figure 15 . On average, in "ACL4," one rule is overlapped with three preceding rules. In addition, "ACL4" has a lot of predicates that have "any" type of predicates in the rule set. That is the reason for the rapid increase of execution time. "ACL1," "ACL2," and "ACL3," which have low ROC values show a linear increase in the cost of rule rewriting. Though "ACL3" has more rules than "ACL2," "ALC3" shows a better execution time than "ACL2" because of the low ROC value. Also, Fig. 7 shows the effect of ROC in "SNT" rules. Keeping the number of rules, we changed the average ROC by replacing rules with other rules having "any" destination port in Snort rules. As ROC increases, the execution time and number of rewritten rules are linearly increase. In Table 5 , after executing the PAR with each rule set, we analyzed the result. The PAR searched policy anomalies in each rule set. For example, the poorly-managed rule set, "ACL4," with an average ROC of 2.77, has 34% complete redundancy and 65% partial redundancy of total rules, while the well-managed rule set, "ACL3," with an average ROC of 0.01, has little complete redundancy and partial redundancy. The PAR not only finds policy anomalies but also it removes them as Table 5 shows. Rules with complete redundancy or shadowing are useless in a rule set. Therefore, they have to be removed from the rule set. Likewise, rules with partial redundancy or shadowing can be rewritten without overlaps. Rewritten rules by the PAR do not have policy anomalies.
Conclusions
The policy maintenance is a complex and error-prone task. The policy anomaly problem arises from the overlaps among the rules and results in security holes for attackers. In this paper, classifying rules by the network direction, the proposed method reduced the unnecessary cost of rule comparisons to find policy anomalies. Also, we found a new kind of anomaly which can occur under a two-way communication protocol. The proposed method for a single security device not only removes overlapping relations among the rules, but it also rewrites the rules without the anomalies and overlapping relations. In multiple security devices, we proposed a new way to avoid the anomaly, not to find the anomalies. The proposed method can reduce the overhead to compare rules for finding anomaly and block the unnecessary traffic from the source communication node.
We implemented the proposed method into a window application called the Policy Anomaly Resolver (PAR) and tested it with real rule sets. The PAR converts original rules to non-overlapping and anomaly-free rules without change of original policy. Therefore, it makes tasks for rule management simple and clear. The PAR has disadvantages in the processing overhead for a large scale rules like other methods. Therefore, we are trying to find more efficient method to perform this process.
